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Abstract
We propose a model of environmental overcompliance in a duopoly
setting where consumers are environmentally concerned and may pa-
tronise the product they buy, rms set their green investment to
abate the impact of productivity on pollution and a government sets
the environmental standard with the aim to maximise welfare. We
show that, with no patronising consumers, overcompliance is unilat-
eral by the rm with higher quality standard under Bertrand behav-
iour, whereas both rms may overcomply under Cournot competition
if the environmental impact of production is su¢ ciently low. Con-
versely with patronising consumers, overcompliance is unilateral with
low environmental impact of production under price competition, and
both rm overcomply under quantity competition.
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1 Introduction
Environmental overcompliance takes place when rms voluntarily conform to
environmental standards higher than the ones required by the environmental
regulation. There is a large evidence documenting the growing of environ-
mental overcompliance (see Lyon and Maxwell, 2004 for a discussion).
The economic literature proposed several explanation of environmental
overcompliance. One argument relies upon the assumption that consumers
are environmentally concerned and thus they reward rms that overcomply
by redirecting their demand towards them (Arora and Gangopadhyay 1995
(from now on, AG95), Bansal and Gangopadhyay, 2003, and Bagnoli and
Watts, 2003, inter alia). Another explanation is that overcompliance has the
aim to preempt the enactment of tighter regulation (Maxwell et al., 2000,
and Lyon and Maxwell, 2003, inter alia). Finally, Denicolò (2008) suggests
that a rm can overcomply to signal an uninformed government about low
overcompliance costs and thus leading the government to require a tougher
regulation. Here overcompliance has the purpose of raising rivals costs.
The present analysis nests in the approach related to the presence of
green consumers. In particular, AG95 and Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2003)
examine a vertically di¤erentiated duopoly where rms sell a good di¤ering
in environmental quality (due to higher environmental production standards)
and compete in prices. They show that overcompliance may emerge but
[i] the environmental standard is exogenously determined and thus not
established through social welfare maximisation,
[ii] they do not consider the presence of the environmental externality
(which in turn a¤ects the endogenously-determined environmental stan-
dard) and
[iii] competition in quantities is not taken into account.
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In this paper we take the AG95s standpoint by considering the presence
of an environmental externality, and endogenously setting the environmental
standard through social welfare maximisation by the government. Further,
we evaluate the introduction of an environmental standard with Cournot
competition. Finally, we investigate the case in which consumers are green
and patronisethe good they choose to buy, i.e., they specically care about
the environmental impact of the good they buy.
Our results show that, with no patronising consumers, an environmen-
tal standard quality brings about unilateral overcompliance by the rm with
higher quality standard under Bertrand behaviour, whereas both rms over-
comply under Cournot competition if the environmental impact of produc-
tion is su¢ ciently low. The result can be explained by the interaction be-
tween the price e¤ect, that induces the two rms to increase environmental
quality di¤erentiation, and the environmental standard: the rm with lower
environmental standard would lower its price (and thus its environmental
quality) in order to acquire consumers that otherwise would not have bought
the good, therefore the introduction of an environmental standard would in-
duce an increase in quality. This may not happen under Cournot behaviour
competition, since competition is softer and thus less di¤erentiation occurs.
Therefore the low-environmental-quality rm may set its quality above the
standard. On the other hand, the rm with higher environmental quality
raises its price (and quality) because of the price e¤ect and by doing this it
overcomplies.
Conversely, when we consider patronising consumers, overcompliance is
unilateral if the environmental impact of production is su¢ ciently low and
under Bertrand behaviour, and both rm overcomply under Cournot com-
petition. Here the environmental quality contributes with the price e¤ect
to maximise prots. This because a consumer specically cares about the
pollution of the purchased good. Since a rm want to keep a relatively
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high environmental standard to please consumers, quality di¤erentiation is
smaller than the previous case, and this in turn increases the situation where
overcompliance takes place.
The present analysis is similar to the literature on minimum quality stan-
dard in polluting industries, where the quality of goods is exclusively hedonic
(see Lambertini and Tampieri (2012a) and Ecchia et al. (2011)). Papers that
consider green consumers are also André et al. (2009) and Lambertini and
Tampieri (2012b). Finally, Garcia-Gallego and Georgantzis (2009) assume
green consumer in a duopoly setting where rms follow rules of Corporate
Social Responsibility.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents
the model, Section 3 and 4 examine the results, both in price and quantity
competition, with non-patronising and patronising consumers, respectively.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a duopoly market for homogeneous products supplied by single-
product rms. Production entails a negative environmental externality s > 0:
Firms can adopt a cleaning technology q 2 [0; Q] that reduces emissions, at
a cost c (q) :We denote the rm that invests more in the cleaning technology
and its competitor as G and B; respectively, so that qG > qB: From now
on, we will denote the good produced by rm G as green and the good
produced by rm B as brown.
The demand side is modelled à la Mussa and Rosen (1978). There is
a continuum of consumers di¤ering in the environmental concern, and the
consumer types are identied by the index , uniformly distributed with
density equal to one in the interval [0;] (thus total demand is equal to
). Parameter  represents the consumersmarginal willingness to pay for a
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good produced according to green standards. Each consumer is assumed to
buy at most one unit of the good in order to maximise the following surplus
function:
U = qi   pi; (1)
where pi is the market price at which that variety is supplied by rm i = G;B:
Therefore, the consumer who is indi¤erent between qG and qB is identied
by the level of marginal willingness to pay b that solves
bqG   pG = bqB   pB; (2)
and therefore b = (pG   pB) = (qG   qB). Thus, market demand for the green
good is xG =    b. We assume partial market coverage, so that there is
another consumer, identied by e, who is indi¤erent between buying qB or
not buying at all: eqB   pB = 0; (3)
whereby e = pB=qB and the demand for the inferior variety is xB = b   e.
Accordingly, we can dene consumer surplus as follows:
CS =
Z b
e (kqB   pB)dk+
Z 
b (zqG   pG)dz: (4)
This is what one needs to use in order to model Bertrand behaviour, while
inverse demands
pG = (  xG) qG   qBxB
pB = (  xG   xB) qB
(5)
are to be used under Cournot competition.
On the supply side, we denote as G = pGxG   cG (qG) and B =
pBxB   cB (qB) the prot functions of the green and brown-quality rm,
respectively, where ci (qi) > 0; c0i; c
00
i > 0 and the marginal cost of production
is normalised to zero. Production entails a negative environmental external-
ity s = b (xG=qG + xB=qB), with b > 0, measuring the negative impact of
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production on the environment.1 Social welfare is determined by the sum of
prots and consumer surplus, minus the environmental externality:
W = CS + G + B   s: (6)
It is important noting that the consumersutility function can be modied by
embedding the amount of pollution produced without changing any result.
Indeed, with U = qi   pi   s would not modify the expressions of b and e
resulting from bqH pH s = bqL pL s and eqL pL s =  s; respectively.
Competition takes place in two stages. In the rst, rms choose the
investment in environmental quality and in the second market competition
takes place. Moves are simultaneous in both stages, and the solution concept
is the subgame perfect equilibrium by backward induction. In what follows,
we investigate separately an industry where price and quantity competition
occurs, respectively.
2.1 Price competition
To begin with, the optimal prices for any given quality pair are:
pNG =
2qG(qG   qB)
4qG   qB ; p
N
B =
qB(qG   qB)
4qG   qB ; (7)
where the superscript N stands for Nash equilibrium. The explicit derivation
is omitted as it can be found in Ronnen (1991).
We now turn to the rst stage in which environmental quality is chosen.
We will prove our results by manipulating the set of the rst order conditions
in the two alternative cases under consideration, i.e., with or without the
1This modelisation of the environmental damage has been borrowed by Lutz et al.
(2000).
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presence of an environmental standard. The relevant prot functions are:
G =
42q2G (qG   qB)
(4qG   qB)2
  cG (qG)
B =
2qGqB (qG   qB)
(4qG   qB)2
  cB (qB)
(8)
With no environmental standard, the rst order conditions for non coopera-
tive prot maximisation are:
@G
@qG
=
42qG (4q
2
G   3qGqB + 2q2B)
(4qG   qB)3
  c0G (qG) = 0; (9)
@B
@qB
=
2q2G (4qG   7qB)
(4qG   qB)3
  c0B (qB) = 0: (10)
We are now in a position to investigate how the investment in environmen-
tal quality is a¤ected by the introduction of an environmental standard. To
perform this task, we follow a procedure by now consolidated in the existing
literature on minimum quality standards. In the regulated case, the govern-
ment introduces an environmental standard aimed at a¤ecting directly the
behaviour of rm B. Firm Gs FOC remains unchanged, while the regulator
solves:
@W
@qB
=
q2H [q
2
Gq
2
B (20qG   17qB) + 4b (qG   qB) (4qG   qB) (2qG + qB)]
2q2B (4qH   qL)3
(11)
 c0B (qB) = 0:
For any pair of generic qualities (qG; qB) ; overcompliance from rm G occurs
once that the environmental regulation is binding (and therefore brings about
an increase in both environmental qualities) if @W=@qB > @B=@qB: The
presence of a negative externality implies that
sign

@W
@qB
  @L
@qB

= sign

3q2Gq
2
B + 4b (qG   qB) (2qG + qB)
	
> 0 (12)
7
Note also that both rmsprots are positive for all
cG (qG) <
42q2G (qG   qB)
(4qG   qB)2
; cB (qB) <
2qGqB (qG   qB)
(4qG   qB)2
; (13)
and that
42q2G (qG   qB)
(4qG   qB)2
  
2qGqB (qG   qB)
(4qG   qB)2
=
42qG (qG   qB)
4qG   qB > 0: (14)
The foregoing discussion can be summarised in
Proposition 1 Under Bertrand behaviour an environmental standard qual-
ity brings about unilateral overcompliance by the rm with higher environ-
mental standard.
Proposition 1 can be explained in the following way. Prot maximisation
under Bertrand competition implies that rms strongly di¤erentiate in prices
(and thus in environmental quality) in order to increase the market coverage,
i.e., rmB sets its quality at a lower level to acquire consumers that otherwise
would not have bought the good. Therefore the environmental standard is
always above the quality level of rm B. Still for the competition e¤ect, rm
G raises its environmental quality at a higher level than the environmental
standard.
2.2 Quantity competition
In this section we investigate whether the introduction of environmental stan-
dard of production leads to overcompliance in an industry where rms com-
pete in quantities. To begin with, we characterise optimal outputs for any
given environmental quality pair:
xNG =
(2qG   qB)
4qG   qB ; x
N
B =
qG
4qG   qB (15)
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The explicit derivation of the Cournot equilibrium is omitted as it is known
from Motta (1993).
We now turn to the rst stage where the environmental game takes place.
Like for price competition, we will prove our results by manipulating the set
of the rst order conditions. The relevant prot functions are:
G =
2qG (2qG   qB)2
(4qG   qB)2
  cG (qG)
L =
2q2HqL
(4qH   qL)2
  cB (qL)
(16)
Without regulation of environmental quality, the rst order conditions for
non cooperative prot maximisation are:
@G
@qG
=
2 (16q3G   12q2GqB + 4qGq2B   q3B)
(4qG   qB)3
  cG (qG) = 0; (17)
@B
@qB
=
2q2B (4qG + qB)
(4qG   qL)3
  cB (qB) = 0: (18)
The optimal regulation of environmental quality requires solving the follow-
ing:
@W
@qB
=
 [q2Gq
2
B (4qG + 3qB) + 4b (8q
3
G   6q2GqB + 5qGq2B   q3B)]
2 (4qG   qB)3 q2B
 c0B (qB) = 0:
(19)
For any pair of generic qualities (qG; qB) ; the introduction of a minimum
environmental standard leads rm G to overcompliance if the environmen-
tal regulation is binding, i.e., if rm B will raise its environmental quality
in order to comply, because in turn this would lead rm G to raise its en-
vironmental quality. This occurs if @W=@qL > @L=@qL: However, if the
minimum environmental standard is not binding, this would imply that both
rms are already overcomplying. By examining the sign of the di¤erence
@W=@qL   @L=@qL; we obtain
sign

@W
@qL
  @L
@qL

= sign

8bq2G   4bqGqB + 4bq2B  q2Gq2B
	
; (20)
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whereby
@W
@qL
>
@L
@qL
for all b > b =
q2Gq
2
B
4 (2q2G   qGqB + q2B)
; (21)
and conversely. Therefore, if b is not large enough, both rms overcomply,
whereas for b su¢ ciently large, only rm G overcomplies. Finally, note that
both rmsprots are positive for all
cG (qG) <
2 (16q3G   12q2GqB + 4qGq2B   q3B)
(4qG   qB)3
; (22)
cB (qL) <
2q2HqL
(4qH   qL)2
The foregoing discussion can be summarised in
Proposition 2 Under Cournot behaviour for b < b; both rm overcomply to
a environmental quality standard, and for b > b rm G unilaterally overcom-
plies.
Under Cournot competition the incentive in overcompliance is stronger
than in the Bertrand case. In particular, both rms overcomply if the mar-
ginal impact of production on pollution is su¢ ciently low. The intuition of
this result can be spelled out as follows. Cournot competition is softer than
Bertrand competition. The competition e¤ect implies that it is not neces-
sary for rm B to lower the price (and therefore the environmental quality)
as much as in the Bertrand case. If the marginal impact of pollution is
su¢ ciently low, the competition e¤ect is such that rm B keeps the environ-
mental quality higher than the socially optimal environmental standard. If
conversely production has a strong impact on pollution, then the regulated
environmental standard would set the environmental quality to a higher level
than the one who maximises the private prot of the B rm, because of the
strong contraction of market coverage which in this case more than o¤set the
competition e¤ect aforementioned.
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3 Patronising consumers
In this section we analyse markets in which consumers specically care for the
pollution of the good they buy. We refer to them as patronisingconsumers
as the specically patronise the green quality of their purchased product.
Unlike the previous scenario, in this case to consider the specic pollution
of the good purchased in the utility function makes a di¤erence according to
the product quality. Therefore a consumers utility function is now
U = qi   pi   b=qi; (23)
where b=qi is the individual pollution due to the production of the good
purchased. Thus, the consumer who is indi¤erent between qG and qB is
identied by the level of marginal willingness to pay b that solves
bqG   pG   b=qG = bqB   pB   b=qB; (24)
and therefore bp = qGqB (pG   pB)  b (qG   qB)
qGqB (qG   qB) : (25)
The consumer ep who is indi¤erent between buying qB or not buying at all
is: epqB   pB   b=qB = 0; (26)
whereby ep = pBqB + b
q2B
: (27)
Thus, market demand for the green and the brown good are xG =    bp
and xB = bp   ep. We now consider the exercise developed in Section 3 in
the case of patronising consumers.
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3.1 Price competition
With price competition, the prots G and B in the second stage are:
G = pG

  qGqB (pG   pB)  b (qG   qB)
qGqB (qG   qB)

  cG (qG)
B =
pB [qGqB (pGqB   pBqG)  b (q2G   q2B)]
qGq2B (qG   qB)
  cB (qB)
(28)
Solving the FOCs w.r.t. prices yields:
pNG =
(qG   qB) [2q2GqB + b (qG   qB)]
qGqB (4qG   qB) ;
pNB =
(qG   qB) [2qGq2B + b (2qG   qB)]
qGqB (4qG   qB) :
(29)
We now turn to the rst stage in which environmental quality is chosen.
With no environmental standard, the rst order conditions for non coopera-
tive prot maximisation are:
@G
@qG
=
2q4Gq
2
B (4q
2
G   3qGqB + 2q2B) + 24bq3Gq2B (qG   qB)
q3Gq
2
B (4qG   qB)3
  (30)
b2 (qG   qB)2 (4q2G   15qGqB + 2q2B)
q3Gq
2
B (4qG   qB)3
  c0G (qG) = 0;
@B
@qB
=
2q3Gq
4
B (4qG   7qB) + 2bqGq4B [8q3G   6qGqB (qG   qB) + q3B]
qGq4B (4qG   qB)3
 
(31)
b2 (48q4G   20q3GqB   12q2Gq2B + 9qGq3B + 2q4B)
qGq4B (4qG   qB)3
  c0B (qB) = 0:
In the regulated case, the regulator solves:
@W
@qB
=
2q4Gq
4
B (20qG   17qB) + 2bq2Gq2B (16q3G   12q2GqB + 5q3B)
2q2Gq
4
B (4qH   qL)3
  (32)
b2 (144q5G   36q4GqB   56q3Gq2B + 33q2Gq3B   6qGq4B + 2q5B)
2q2Gq
4
B (4qH   qL)3
  c0B (qB) = 0:
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By examining the sign of the di¤erence @W=@qL   @L=@qL; we obtain
sign

@W
@qL
  @L
@qL

= sign

6bq2Gq
4
B   32q4Gq4B+ (33)
b2
 
12q4G + 4q
3
GqB   7q2Gq2B + 2qGq3B   2q4B
	
;
whereby
@W
@qL
>
@L
@qL
for all (34)
b < eb = 3q2Gq2B
3q2B + [3 (qG + qB) (12q
3
G   8q2GqB + qGq2B + q3B)]1=2
(35)
and conversely.
The foregoing discussion can be summarised in
Proposition 3 Under Bertrand behaviour and patronising consumers, if b >eb; both rm overcomply to a environmental quality standard, and if b < eb rm
G unilaterally overcomplies.
Proposition 3 intuitively shows that, if a consumer specically cares about
the pollution of the purchased good and the marginal impact of production
in pollution is su¢ ciently high, then both rms would increase the environ-
mental quality level in order to increase the number of customers and thus
their prots, irrespective of the socially optimal standard. Now indeed com-
petition is not only related to price di¤erences, like in the cases outlined
in the previous section, but it is also related on keeping the environmental
quality relatively high in order to satisfy the patronising customers, and this
o¤sets the price e¤ect for a high b. When b is not so high instead, then the
price e¤ect is stronger and overcompliance is unilateral:
13
3.2 Quantity Competition
With quantity competition, the prots G and B in the second stage are:
G = xG

qG (  xG)  qBxB   b
qG

  cG (qG)
B =
xB [q
2
B (  xG   xB)  b]
qB
  cB (qB)
(36)
Solving the FOCs w.r.t. quantities yields:
xNG =
qGqB (2qG   qB) + b (qG   2qB)
qGqB (4qG   qB) ;
xNB =
q2Gq
2
B   b (2q2G   2qB)
qGq2B (4qG   qB)
:
(37)
In the rst stage where the environmental game takes place and with-
out regulation of environmental quality, the rst order conditions for non
cooperative prot maximisation are:
@G
@qG
=
2q2Gq
2
B (16q
3
G   12q2GqB + 4qGq2B   q3B) + 2bq2Gq2B (16qG   11qB)
q2Gq
2
B (4qG   qB)3
 
(38)
b2 (4q3G   31q2GqB + 48qGq2B + 4q3B)
q2Gq
2
B (4qG   qB)3
  c0G (qG) = 0;
@B
@qB
=
2q4Gq
4
B (4qG + qB) + 2bq
2
Gq
2
B (8q
3
G   6q2GqB + 4qGq2B + q3B)
q4Gq
4
B (4qG   qB)3
  (39)
b2 (48q5G   20q4GqB   16q3Gq2B + 12q2Gq3B   4qGq4B   q5B)
q4Gq
4
B (4qG   qB)3
  c0B (qB) = 0:
The optimal regulation of environmental quality requires solving the follow-
ing:
@W
@qB
=
2q4Gq
4
B (4qG + 3qB) + 2bq
2
Gq
2
B (16q
3
G   12q2GqB + 12qGq2B + q3B)
2q2Gq
4
B (4qG   qB)3
 
(40)
b2 (144q5G   68q4GqB   60q3Gq2B + 48q2Gq3B   24qGq4B + q5B)
q4Gq
4
B (4qG   qB)3
  c0B (qB) = 0:
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By examining the sign of the di¤erence @W=@qL   @L=@qL; we obtain
sign

@W
@qL
  @L
@qL

= sign

2bq2Gq
4
B  2q4Gq4B  ; (41)
b2
 
12q4G   4q3GqB   8q2Gq2B + 4qGq3B   3q4B
	
< 0.
The foregoing discussion can be summarised in
Proposition 4 Under Cournot behaviour and patronising consumers both
rm overcomply to a environmental quality standard.
The reason of this result is the same as for price competition, but now the
e¤ect of keeping a high environmental quality in order to acquire patronising
consumers is stronger due to the softer competition under Cournot behaviour.
4 Concluding remarks
We have analysed a duopoly model of environmental overcompliance with
green consumers and a government setting the environmental standard with
the aim to maximise welfare. When consumers do not patronise the good
they buy, unilateral overcompliance takes place under Bertrand behaviour,
whereas both rms may overcomply under Cournot competition if the envi-
ronmental impact of production is su¢ ciently low. On the other hand with
patronising consumers, overcompliance is unilateral with low environmental
impact of production under Bertrand competition, and both rm overcomply
under Cournot behaviour.
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